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religious liberty are insecure, and have only a pragmatic, not a principled 
basis. Whatever the faults of Corvino’s criticisms of religious liberty, I fear 
Anderson and Girgis are committed, by their own lights, to restricting 
religious liberty far more greatly than Corvino proposes. This will place 
them uncomfortably close to the new Catholic integralists, who embrace 
a coercive establishmentarian politics with greatly restricted religious lib-
erty for non-Catholics.
Our Fate: Essays on God and Free Will , by John Martin Fischer. Oxford Uni-
versity Press, 2016. Pp. vii + 243. $ 78 (hardcover).
ALICIA FINCH, Northern Illinois University
John Martin Fischer’s Our Fate: Essays on God and Free Will is a compilation 
of eleven previously published essays on the topic of divine foreknowl-
edge and human freedom (where freedom is understood as the ability 
to do otherwise than one does). With clear and accessible prose, Fischer 
relentlessly argues for the thesis that divine foreknowledge and human 
freedom are incompatible (a thesis that I will hereafter refer to as incom-
patibilismFF). Throughout the volume, he carefully considers various ob-
jections to his argument, paying particular attention to Ockhamism. Some 
of his more recent essays (co-authored with Patrick Todd and/or Neal 
Tognazzini) emphasize that the issue of explanatory dependence is central to 
the debate. In the end, it seems that although Fischer is convinced by the 
argument for incompatibilismFF, he is not troubled by it. Of course, no one 
familiar with his work defending semi-compatibilism should be surprised: 
Fischer has repeatedly argued that it is possible to be morally responsible 
for one’s actions even if one lacks the freedom to do otherwise; he has 
further argued that, in the light of this possibility, there is no reason to be 
troubled by the lack of such freedom.
In what follows, I will summarize the previously published essays, 
pausing to evaluate the version of the argument for incompatibilismFF on 
which Fischer relies. I will then explain why, despite some objections, I 
cannot do otherwise than recommend this book.
Over the course of the essays, Fischer considers three versions of the 
argument for incompatibilismFF: the “Transfer Version,” the “Conditional 
Version,” and the “Possible-Worlds Version.” In “Scotism,” Fischer criti-
cally evaluates Sir Anthony Kenny’s “Scotistic” response to a Transfer 
Version of the argument, where (i) all Transfer Versions of the argument 
rely (implicitly or explicitly) on so-called “transfer principles” and (ii) 




the “general feature of transfer principles is that they are what Timothy 
O’Connor has called ‘modal slingshots’; they shoot a modal property from 
one item to another (via a certain means).” (3) In this essay (and in the in-
troduction), Fischer suggests that transfer principles are best avoided; he 
subsequently offers a Conditional Version of the argument—an argument 
that reappears, in one form or another, throughout this volume.
When presenting either the Conditional or the Possible Worlds Ver-
sion of the argument for incompatibilismFF, Fischer invokes some basic 
assumptions:
‘God’ [is] the name of the individual who necessarily has the Divine Attri-
butes. For the purposes of our discussion, the key attributes are (essential) 
eternality and (essential) omniscience. By ‘eternality’ I mean “sempiternal-
ity”; God exists at all times. Further, God’s omniscience implies that (for any 
proposition P), God believes that P if and only if P is true. (2)
Moreover, he repeatedly asks us to suppose that “God (as conceptualized 
above) exists” and that “[S]ome ordinary agent Jones does some ordinary 
act X (like mowing his lawn) at time T2” (2). In addition, he notes that 
“Arguably, it follows from God’s essential omniscience and eternality that 
God believed at T1 that Jones would do X at T2 [where T1 is earlier than 
T2]” (2). Finally, Fischer relies on some variation on the principle of the 
“fixity of the past,” where this principle is, roughly, the thesis that the 
past is “over and done with” and, as such, it is too late for anyone to do 
anything about it.
When presenting the Conditional Version of the argument in particu-
lar, Fischer relies on a formulation of the principle of the fixity of the past 
relevantly similar to this:
(FP) For any action Y, agent S, and time T, if it is true that if S were to 
do Y at T, some fact about the past relative to T would not have 
been a fact, then S cannot at (or just prior to) T do Y at T (5).
However, in “Power over the Past” and “Foreknowledge, Freedom, and 
the Fixity of the Past,” Fischer admits that there is reason to doubt (FP). 
While Fischer does not concede the falsity of (FP), he is not particularly 
concerned to defend it. After all, as he points out, the argument for incom-
patibilismFF does not depend on the truth of (FP), even if it depends on the 
truth of some principle of the fixity of the past.
With this, Fischer goes on to offer a Possible-Worlds formulation of the 
principle and, of course, a Possible Worlds Version of the argument for 
incompatibilismFF. The relevant principle is:
(FP*) An agent can at T do X at T only if there exists some possible world 
with the same past relative to T as the actual world in which the 
agent does X at T (111).
Given the preceding assumptions, it follows that:
God believed at T1 that Jones would do X at T2. Since God is essentially 
omniscient, His belief at T1 that Jones does X at T2 entails that Jones does X 
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at T2. By the possible-worlds definition of entailment, in all possible worlds 
in which God believes at T1 that Jones would do X at T2, Jones does X at T2. 
So in any possible world in which Jones does not do X at T2, God doesn’t 
believe at T1 that Jones does X at T2. It follows from (FP*) that Jones does not 
have it in his power at . . . T2 to refrain from X-ing at T2. (6)
Since this point about the agent Jones, his action X, the time T1, and the 
later time T2 can be generalized to a point about any agent, any action, 
and any two (distinct) times, the Possible Worlds Version of the argument 
for incompatibilismFF is complete.
Let us grant, for the sake of argument, that the Conditional Version of 
the argument is sound only if the Possible Worlds Version is. Next, let us 
consider that unless one challenges Fischer’s conception of God, the Pos-
sible Worlds Version of the argument stands or falls with (FP*). And now 
let us pause to consider what this principle amounts to.
First, it seems worthwhile to note that (FP*) does not obviously capture 
the notion of the fixity of the past. Within the free will literature, the “prin-
ciple of the fixity of the past” usually refers to the thesis that it is no longer 
up to anyone what happened in the past; this thesis is usually expressed 
in terms similar to these:
(FP′): For any agent S, any proposition p, and any time t, if (i) p describes 
a state of affairs that obtains prior to t, then (ii) it is not up to S at 
or after t whether p.
Fischer’s (FP*), by contrast, says this:
(FP**): For any agent S, any proposition p, and any time t, if (i) p de-
scribes a state of affairs that obtains prior to t and (ii) p entails q, 
then (iii) it is not up to S at or after t whether q.
(where, I take it, (FP*) and (FP**) are equivalent.)
Of course, this point is relatively minor: it’s not as if Fischer baits his 
reader by arguing for (FP′) and then switches to (FP*) when he presents 
his argument for incompatibilismFF. Indeed, he explicitly says that the 
Possible Worlds version of the argument “gets its basic impetus from an 
insight from Carl Ginet: an agent S has it in his power to do X only if it is 
possible that X be an extension of the [actual] past” (6). Since Ginet’s basic 
insight seems to be equivalent to (FP*), Fischer seems to be suggesting that 
there is no need to argue for (FP*). Moreover, whether or not we call (FP*) 
the principle of the fixity of the past, what matters is whether it is true.
This brings me to my second, more serious point about (FP*): its truth 
is not as obvious to everyone as it seems to be to Fischer. One could argue 
for its truth if one appealed to (FP′) and a transfer principle, e.g.:
(Transfer): For any agent S, any proposition p, and any time t, if (i) p is 
true and it is not up to S at t whether p and (ii) p entails q, then 
(iii) q is true and it is not up to S at t whether q.
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After all, the conjunction of (FP′) and (Transfer) obviously entails (FP**) 
(which, again, I take to be equivalent to (FP*)). But Fischer emphatically 
rejects this strategy, insisting that the truth of (FP*) is more obvious than 
the validity of transfer principles. Moreover, he is not at all convinced that 
transfer principles are valid. It is thus far better, according to Fischer, to 
assess the truth of (FP*) directly instead of trying to derive it in a round-
about way.
While I certainly appreciate his strategy (including his attempt to avoid 
contentious debates about the validity of transfer principles), I must con-
fess that (FP*)’s truth is simply not obvious to me. Indeed, when I try to 
evaluate (FP*) without considering the truth of (FP′) and the validity of 
(Transfer), I am at a loss. I offer this autobiographical information because I 
suspect that I am not the only one who is similarly confounded. Of course, 
I realize that others share Fischer’s conviction that (FP*) is obviously true. 
My point is this: while it may be reasonable for those who agree with 
Fischer about (FP*) to endorse his claim that the Possible Worlds Version 
of the argument is superior to the Transfer Version, this would not be rea-
sonable for everyone. Those of us who find (FP*) convincing only if we de-
rive it from principles like (FP′) and (Transfer) might reasonably conclude 
that the Transfer Version of the argument for incompatibilismFF is the best 
version available.
Instead of quibbling over how best to formulate the argument, though, 
it is worthwhile to consider how best to respond to it. As I have already 
mentioned, Fischer devotes more attention to Ockhamism than to any 
other response to the argument. I want to be clear, though, that he does 
not ignore other responses. For instance, in “Freedom and Actuality,” he 
considers whether one could defeat the argument if one insisted that all 
propositions about the future are world-indexed; he (rightly) concludes 
that one could not. In “Putting Molinism in its Place,” he argues that 
Molinism does not constitute a response to the argument, but rather pre-
supposes such a response. Moreover, in “Engaging with Pike: God, Free-
dom, and Time” (co-authored with Patrick Todd and Neil Tognazzini), 
Fischer offers a brief survey of other responses to the argument, includ-
ing atemporalism (according to which God is outside of time and, hence, 
does not have foreknowledge at all) and Open Theism (which he defines 
as “the thesis that there are things that happen that God has not always 
believed—and hence has not always known—would happen”) (168).
Again, though, the response that receives the most attention is Ock-
hamism. Fischer follows the convention of presenting Ockhamism in 
terms of a distinction between “hard facts” and “soft facts.” Quoting Nel-
son Pike, Fischer characterizes a hard fact as “‘fully accomplished and 
over-and-done-with’ at the relevant time” (131). A soft fact, by contrast, is 
“temporally relational.” Following Alvin Plantinga, Fischer suggests that 
“it is a mark of a soft fact that it entails that a certain sort of fact . . . obtains 
in the future” (132). As characterized by Fischer, the “Ockhamist position 
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. . . is that (a) facts which only appear to be strictly about the past but are 
really also about the future do not carry the necessity of the past [i.e., they 
are not “fixed”], and (b) God’s beliefs are precisely this sort of fact” (133). 
So, the fact that God believes at T1 that Jones performs X at T2 is a soft 
fact at T1; since it is soft fact, it is false that Jones can refrain from doing 
X at T2 only if there exists some possible world in which (i) God believes 
at T1 that Jones performs X at T2 and (ii) Jones refrains from performing 
X at T2.
In “Ockhamism: The Facts,” Fischer argues that even if certain facts 
about God’s beliefs at a time T are soft facts (at T ), these facts have “hard 
features” (135). In order to illustrate this point, we can imagine that I—a 
non-omniscient being—believe at T1 that Jones will do X at T2. Once T1 
has passed, it certainly seems “over and done with” that I believed what 
I believed at T1. Moreover, it seems that God’s mental states are enough 
like ours that if God had a particular belief at T1, it is over and done with 
at later times that God had that belief. Granted, God is omniscient and, 
hence, God’s beliefs about the future entail that the future will be a certain 
way; this is why Fischer is willing to say that it was a soft fact at T1 that 
God believed Jones would do X at T2. But even if this complex fact was 
soft, one feature of this fact—God’s particular mental state at T1—seems 
hard, and this hardness is a problem for the Ockhamist. In “Snapshot Ock-
hamism,” Fischer offers an ingenious way to draw the distinction between 
hard and soft facts. In the end, though, he concludes that Ockhamism 
nonetheless faces insurmountable problems.
To me, Fischer’s assessment of Ockhamism seems more positive by the 
time he and his co-authors write “Engaging with Pike.” Though Fischer 
never endorses Ockhamism, his (co-authored) description of the position 
seems richer and more nuanced than what he offered in the earlier pieces. 
In particular, he and his co-authors acknowledge that “the Ockhamist 
appeals to a claim concerning explanatory dependence” (170). Indeed, the 
Ockhamist insists that the order of dependence is crucial: if God believed 
at T1 that Jones would do X at T2, God had this belief at T1 because of what 
Jones does at T2; in contrast, Jones does not do X at T2 because of what 
God believed at T1. Moreover, “According to Ockhamist thinking, if one 
has the power to bring about that something is the case, then one has the 
power to bring it about that it always was the case that it would be the case” 
(170). From here, Fischer and his co-authors argue that if Ockhamism is 
tenable, eternalism is true, where “Eternalism is the thesis that past, pres-
ent, and future objects all equally exist” (174). (I note that in the introduc-
tion to the volume, Fischer suggests that he and Todd have changed their 
minds about the relationship between eternalism and Ockhamism, but he 
does not explain why, exactly, they have done so. To me, this seems like a 
frustrating omission.)
In “The Truth about Freedom” and “The Truth about Foreknowledge,” 
Fischer and co-author Patrick Todd respond to Trenton Merricks’s charge 
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that the basic argument for the incompatibility of divine foreknowledge 
and freedom is question-begging. They also criticize Merricks’s discussion 
of Ockhamism, suggesting that he has fundamentally misunderstood the 
position.
In the final essay reprinted here, “Omniscience, Freedom, and Depen-
dence,” Fischer and Neal Tognazzini argue that the responses to the argu-
ment for incompatibilismFF offered by Storrs McCall, Trenton Merricks, 
and Jonathan Westphal are failures of philosophical engagement. Accord-
ing to Fischer and Tognazzini, these responses amount to little more than 
asserting that the argument is invalid or that one of the premises is false. 
In the spirit of charity, they suggest that perhaps these responses should 
be construed as either (i) attempts to motivate a “Moorean shift,” whereby 
they are suggesting that we ought to be more confident in the compat-
ibility of freedom and foreknowledge than we are in the soundness of the 
argument or (ii) Ockhamism by another name. Either way, they suggest, 
their interlocutors fail to offer a new philosophical response to the argu-
ment: the former is not really a philosophical response at all; the latter 
response is not new.
Given that (with the exception of the introduction) each essay included 
here has been previously published, one might question the wisdom of 
purchasing this volume. As I see it, the purchase is worthwhile for several 
reasons. First, some of Fischer’s work on incompatibilismFF is not easily 
available elsewhere. Second, it is convenient to have his most important 
papers on the topic gathered together in one place. Indeed, I can imagine 
an excellent course on freedom and foreknowledge that uses this volume 
and the 2014 volume he co-edited with Patrick Todd (Freedom, Fatalism, 
and Foreknowledge, Oxford) as the central texts. Moreover, by reading the 
papers in the order in which he presents them, one can gain insight into 
the progression of Fischer’s thought and note the apparent influences of 
Todd and Tognazzini. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the intro-
ductory essay is outstanding. Fischer provides a comprehensive introduc-
tion not only to his own work on incompatibilismFF, but to the debate in 
general. As I have already suggested, the introduction brings his work 
on incompatibilismFF into conversation with his extensive work on semi-
compatibilism. Perhaps most strikingly, he argues for the novel thesis that 
it is possible for God to be certain that a particular event will occur, even 
if that event occurs indeterministically (and, hence, is not determined to 
occur by the past, present, and the laws of nature), and even if God does 
not have direct apprehension of future events. While I myself was not 
convinced by the argument, I cannot deny that it was both clever and in-
teresting, and that it demands a response.
In the acknowledgements, Fischer thanks Neal Tognazzini and Patrick 
Todd for encouraging him to put together this volume. In my view, any-
one working on freedom and foreknowledge owes Tognazzini and Todd 
a debt of gratitude, because we should all be grateful that this book exists.
